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Is Perception Unreliable?
This is an interesting debate brought up on Wikipedia’s entry on philosophical skepticism entry (as opposed to scientific skepticism):
Hume’s argument basically says that we can’t know anything about the external world, because to know that we would have to know that there is a connection between our sense-data and the external world that they are supposed to represent. But the only thing we have contact with are our sense-data; we can never know anything in the external world except by first knowing our sense-data. But then we have no way to prove the connection between our sense-data and the external world. So we have no way to prove that our sense-data do represent any external world — and that is to say that we have no way to prove that perception is reliable.
[…] in order to show that your sense of sight works, you use your sense of sight and other senses; in order to show that your sense of hearing works, you use your sense of hearing and other senses.
This feeds into some earlier discussions on the nature of reality as perceived by us, as compared to how it’s augmented by instrumentation. I suppose you could either look at this as some real Zen shit, or you could say that none of it matters at all. I’m more inclined towards the Zen argument, and am looking at it because it’s yet another example of how language and reason can be used against itself.
Here’s also an excellent quote from Descartes who was one of the great philosophical skeptics:
If you would be a real seeker after truth, you must at least once in your life doubt, as far as possible, all things.
Whoo!
July 16th, 2005 at 11:07 pm
Something Hume fails to consider is: why make a distinction between “sense data” and “external world” in the first place? Instead of detaching yourself from your senses by calling them “data,” and imagining some kind of world with objective existence independent of being sensed, you can make the whole issue irrelevant by just defining reality as what you experience.
July 16th, 2005 at 11:29 pm
Yeah, but maybe he addresses that somewhere. I’m not especially familiar with his writings. It seems to me to go back to the question of: if we each define reality as what we experience, we inevitably encounter shockingly different realities which in some cases contradict one another.
Descartes too goes into that proof about how can you prove life is not a dream? Seems to conclude that you can’t really prove it. But again if reality consists of what you experience, then dreams and waking life are no different, and are both equally real and thus distinguishing between the two becomes meaningless.
It’s only to someone who hasn’t experienced either you or your dreams that you might not be real. Which I guess technically is solipsism. There is nothing but you, er, me, I mean - er, the “individual experiencer”. Descartes reduced that to the one indubitable principle: “I think therefore I am.” I haven’t read far enough to see if he somehow is able to conclude from that that other people’s experiences can be proven to exist.
It seems like religiously, there’s a good solution to this in monism: that the “I” that I refer to and the “I” that you refer to are actually fundamentally the same. This seems in one sense to solve the problem that we each have different experiences. If there’s not actually any division between us, then all the direct experiences of each of us are equally real, equally valid
July 17th, 2005 at 7:36 am
(Forgive the length here. I got myself going and couldn’t stop, and so I’ll offer my particularly expressive apologies in this case if what I have to say is, after all, total rubbish.)
Actually it doesn’t go back to the so-called “question” of encountering shockingly different realities which in some cases contradict one another, not when you define reality as what you experience. There really isn’t a question here; just a couple of simple, analytic truths.
A straight pole sticking out of the water appears to be bent, at least if the water is clear enough. The “sense data” here is an apparently bent mass of colors by which “the pole” has been defined. When the pole is removed from the water, the sense data is no longer a bent mass of colors, but a straight mass of colors. Whether or not this constitutes a separate instance of “reality” depends, of course, on how you define reality. Obviously you already understand this much, but use this classic example to really think more about what it means to define reality as sense data.
Once you define “reality” as sense data, it is logically impossible to say that instance of removing the pole from the water has introduced a separate, contradictory reality, by simple definition of terms; to see them as separate instances of reality you must put “real” emphasis on the “the pole” which exists as an abstraction in the mind, a so-called “understanding” of the sense data. In other words, you must put “real” emphasis on something other than sense data, which violates the working definition.
I think I can see, however, that you’re not especially concerned with these “academic” specifics–the main idea seems to be coming to terms with the fact often we are often just plain wrong about things, though you could, and indeed do, also phrase it by talking about “different realities” etc. Well, of course you are free to come to terms with life however you like, but I’ll offer a few words in hope that they will be of some use.
I think it is spectacularly counterproductive to think of this–that is, our “faulty” “perception” of so-called “external” “reality”–as something that needs to be “solved”, because on an absolutely fundamental level it cannot be solved by anything less than omniscience. Better just to deal with it.
It seems like you’re particularly fond of intellectualizing things, which is fair enough (I am, too, for my part), so here’s a useful way I have found for thinking about “reality”. Of course “reality” is only an arbitrary grouping of letters, so it doesn’t matter too much what you call it for your own personal purposes, but there are a lot of cultural associations that come with those letters and if you’re not careful they get taken for granted. For instance, what does “real” primarily refer to? Non-non-real. This is of course self-referential, but I think people have a pretty universal connection with what the word is referring to, which could also (however uselessly) be expressed with synonyms like absolute, permanent, etc. We’re talking about the things that are certain, etc.
So why is it, then, that “real” has been chosen to reference “external reality”, and in opposition to “perception”. The answer to this is so ingrained in most people’s minds that it is often difficult for them to articulate it, and it has to do with the same frustration you express: often we’re wrong about things, and when we’re wrong, often other people are right. It seems like the best we can do is move about the world in ignorant darkness, feebly accessing inadequate symbols that only barely suffice. And certainly I identify with that sentiment on a very personal level myself, but I have to argue that it is not sufficient justification for so monopolizing the expression of “real”, and not only because doing so is philosophically incoherent, but also because it compounds the problem in ways that will seem either subtle or not-so-subtle, but in any case will certainly seem unnecessary.
First, the philosophy. Frankly, I have no problem acknowledging the presence of “external reality”. The full disclosure is that I have a profound respect for it, as any person with a scrap of wisdom will respect hurricanes and earthquakes. As a brief aside, in case anybody reading this would make the mistake of thinking that the possibility we’re all living in alien vats in any way affects the expression “external reality”. It does not. “External reality”, if there’s to be any pretense of coherence, must refer to the relative difference between “perception”, to the very “real” experience of moving through a world of “independent” objects. But to get back on topic: what we must consider in this case, and indeed whenever we consider our actions, is what exactly we’re doing when we do the things we do, whether or not what we’re doing is actually useful.
When we reference “external reality” with “real”, we are referencing something that, while for all practical intents and purposes does indeed exist absolutely, can alas never be known as such. Whether we like it or not, we can only *perceive* external reality, and after that can we can only “understand” it by limited processes of abstraction. But there is something that we can know absolutely, something that we can understand with utter certainty, and that something is perception. Given this consideration, giving external reality “real” preference seems, at the very least, to obscure the point that was just made about perception being not only our primary means of engaging life, but our only means. The response to this might still be “So what?”, and actually I can accept that, but personally that is not my response. My response is “Whoa.”
To return to my previous allusion about compounding the problem, I must first admit that all of what I have to say here is strictly speculation, but it has resonated with my experience and maybe it will also resonate with yours. When I see people approaching epistemology, it’s usually in an “emotionally postmodern” (forgive me Lord, I know not what I do) way. These people invariably recognize the truth that external reality cannot be known, and the response is a kind of lament for truth’s passing. It really does seem like what’s missing is an awareness of absolutes, of value, and given this the focus on external reality seems like nothing more than a cultural artifact. I mean, all you have to do is shift your focus to perception and the entire scope of the world (though admittedly now “your world) is filled with realness, with truth and absolute value. So what point is this focus on external reality really serving? It justifies certain social structures, but honestly, fuck ‘em!
P.s. It’s been a while, but I believe Descartes did eventually dispell his skepticism regarding dreams, talking about how the key is they don’t form a coherent narrative when taken in what is perceived as the larger context of life. It was important to note that *while* having the dream, you do not know the difference (obviously there are exceptions– Descartes must not have been aware of them), but indeed the difference can be specified after all.
I’d like to add that a particularly satisfying conclusion of all this is that it is, or at least should be, utterly irrelevant what Descartes thought about proving other people’s existence. Do your own introspection. The only thing that matters is what believing one way or another means to you and how it affects your life and how you feel about those effects.