13 Reader Responses

1. Steven Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 5:45 pm

   There were some protesters here locally (columbus, Oh) who decided to stand outside the theater with large two handled signs. Like most people not used to protesting, they wrote a ton of stuff on the sign. You know the type. The first sentence is really big. In this case, “Da Vinci Code insults our Lord, Jesus Christ!” which is then follwed by a lengthy monologue that decreases in size each line as the sign-maker realized he didn’t have nearly enough room for his general opinion. Then they mistakenly believe that their sign can be read by people traveling by at 45 miles an hour.

   In any case, it never seems to enter people’s minds who are against something media wise that their protests increase interest and they need to find alternative means of protesting than trying to restrict information. It triggers people’s valuing of scare resources if they think something is being held from them. I’m not sure what the solution would be. Perhaps the recent trend of using “negative” media as a spring board for their own version of “positive” media messages might be a way to go. Certainly, publishing well written responses is a good way to go since they’ll outlast the publicity machine and be picked up years later by the curious in libraries.

   One option I can’t recall having seen tried is to meta-twist such messages as being contrary to the initial appeal. For example, in regards to the Da Vinci Code, why can one not accept Jesus marrying Mary Magdalen and having children as being further proof that Jesus believed women should be in traditional roles as wives and mothers? (It also gets rid of all those pesky rumors of Jesus being a homosexual. Well, except maybe on the down low.) I guess what I’m saying is that the act of protesting does little more than solidify the original message as being seen as a threat. It would seem more subversive to question the interpretation given while allowing the “facts” to still stand. Thus allowing for a win/win rather than forcing a win/lose which does little more than make people dig in their heels.

2. Mark S Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 8:20 pm

   Is Tom Hanks going to do Stand up comedy in the movie or something? I remember there was one movie he did back in the 80’s where he was a stand up comedian, but he didn’t wear a wig in that. In my opinion, it’s not like Dan Brown is such a great classic author, that one has to lose countless nights of sleep, just to “become” a character in one of his books. I mean it’s not like Gary Oldman trying to become Bram Stoker’s dracula or something…

   Also, I haven’t seen the movie yet, but I was unimpressed with the trailer. Christopher Plummer, yadda yadda, this is going to change the foundations of human history or something stupid like that. Why can’t Hollywood just tell the freakin story, without the goofy wigs and punchlines, that’s what I don’t understand.

3. Mark S Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 8:29 pm

   Oops wait, a stupid correction. Not Christopher Plummer, I meant Ian McKellen. Not sure how I got those two confused… Yeah Ian McKellen, the same one who made the Bible needs a “Fiction disclaimer” remark. lol

4. Sara Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 8:36 pm

   The difference, Tim, between the Da Vinci Code and the Mohamed cartoons is that one gives an alternative view of history while the other totally equated a prophet with ugly terrorism. Let’s draw Jesus KILLING people and advocating death, rather than the (god forbid) marriage with Magdalene and see how violent people could react.

5. djk Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 9:35 pm

   ha! i love when they do that with protest signs, when the lettering gets smaller and slanted as they scramble to fit it in. very funny. i don’t know what’s more annoying in the news right now, the people’s who’s faith is so easy rattled by any flick that says “jesus…boo!” and runs away, or those assholes setting up little 50 foot borders in Texas and daring someone to cross it. real brave. why don’t they just put the line on the floor in their living room? just as much chance of having someone cross their line of doom. it reminds me of when i got kicked out of a bar and spent the rest of the night annoying the bouncers by putting a foot in and out of their doorway “i’m in! i’m out! i’m in! i’m out!” they eventually called the cops.

   but yeah, Di Vinci Code is a close second lately. they need a Dogma, Last Temptation, Life of Brian, Oh, God! film festival. the protesters would be out there fighting for sidewalk space like Dawn of the Dead (the remake)

6. juno jones Says:
   May 20th, 2006 at 9:47 pm

   Defense of Tradition, Family and Property? HAHAHA! Obviously they mean ‘the Defense of the Tradition of Family AS Property’.

7. Robert Says:
   May 21st, 2006 at 12:18 am

   Wasn’t there a movie in the 70’s called “The Word” that challenged the foundations of Christianity? Anybody remember?

8. Tim Boucher Says:
   May 21st, 2006 at 4:26 am

   The difference, Tim, between the Da Vinci Code and the Mohamed cartoons

   I don’t remember bringing this up in my post at all. If you have comments regarding someone else’s opinions, you would do best to direct them to the original author.

   In any case though, I think you raised an interesting point:

   Let’s draw Jesus KILLING people and advocating death

   Essentially, this is the way that the Da Vinci Code (I just saw it) portrays the Catholic Church. They have made the Catholic Church into a cartoon that advocates death and pain. Are they right and is that a fair characterization is a question that could make for good conversation - and is the real meat that the story’s stated message of the Divine Feminine seems to feed on.

   After watching the movie, I’m more and more convinced that it is indeed a concerted and intentional attack on Christian institutions, if not the underlying values. Is such an attack warranted?

9. JK Says:
   May 21st, 2006 at 5:37 am

   I can’t even begin to express how instructive Baudrillard is in this instance. And it’s funny — I read all this this morning. For I too, saw The Davinci Code this evening. . .

   The divine irreference of images

   To dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one hasn’t. One implies a presence, the other an absence. But the matter is more complicated, since to simulate is not simply to feign: “Someone who feigns an illness can simply go to bed and pretend he is ill. Someone who simulates an illness produces in himself some of the symptoms” (Littre). Thus, feigning or dissimulating leaves the reality principle intact: the difference is always clear, it is only masked; whereas simulation threatens the difference between “true” and “false”, between “real” and “imaginary”. Since the simulator produces “true” symptoms, is he or she ill or not? The simulator cannot be treated objectively either as ill, or as not ill. Psychology and medicine stop at this point, before a thereafter undiscoverable truth of the illness. For if any symptom can be “produced,” and can no longer be accepted as a fact of nature, then every illness may be considered as simulatable and simulated, and medicine loses its meaning since it only knows how to treat “true” illnesses by their objective causes. Psychosomatics evolves in a dubious way on the edge of the illness principle. As for psychoanalysis, it transfers the symptom from the organic to the unconscious order: once again, the latter is held to be real, more real than the former; but why should simulation stop at the portals of the unconscious? Why couldn’t the “work” of the unconscious be “produced” in the same way as any other symptom in classical medicine? Dreams already are.

   The alienist, of course, claims that “for each form of the mental alienation there is a particular order in the succession of symptoms, of which the simulator is unaware and in the absence of which the alienist is unlikely to be deceived.” This (which dates from 1865) in order to save at all cost the truth principle, and to escape the specter raised by simulation: namely that truth, reference and objective caues have ceased to exist. What can medicine do with something which floats on either side of illness, on either side of health, or with the reduplication of illness in a discourse that is no longer true or false? What can psychoanalysis do with the reduplication of the discourse of the unconscious in a discourse of simulation that can never be unmasked, since it isn’t false either?2

   What can the army do with simulators? Traditionally, following a direct principle of identification, it unmasks and punishes them. Today, it can reform an excellent simulator as though he were equivalent to a “real” homosexual, heart-case or lunatic. Even military psychology retreats from the Cartesian clarifies and hesitates to draw the distinction between true and false, between the “produced” symptom and the authentic symptom. “If he acts crazy so well, then he must be mad.” Nor is it mistaken: in the sense that all lunatics are simulators, and this lack of distinction is the worst form of subversion. Against it, classical reason armed itself with all its categories. But it is this today which again outflanks them, submerging the truth principle.

   Outside of medicine and the army, favored terrains of simulation, the affair goes back to religion and the simulacrum of divinity: “l forbade any simulacrum in the temples because the divinity that breathes life into nature cannot be represented.” Indeed it can. But what becomes of the divinity when it reveals itself in icons, when it is multiplied in simulacra? Does it remain the supreme authority, simply incarnated in images as a visible theology? Or is it volatilized into simulacra which alone deploy their pomp and power of fascination — the visible machinery of icons being substituted for the pure and intelligible Idea of God? This is precisely what was feared by the Iconoclasts, whose millennial quarrel is still with us today.3 Their rage to destroy images rose precisely because they sensed this omnipotence of simulacra, this facility they have of erasing God from the consciousnesses of people, and the overwhelming, destructive truth which they suggest: that ultimately there has never been any God; that only simulacra exist; indeed that God himself has only ever been his own simulacrum. Had they been able to believe that images only occulted or masked the Platonic idea of God, there would have been no reason to destroy them. One can live with the idea of a distorted truth. But their metaphysical despair came from the idea that the images concealed nothing at all, and that in fact they were not images, such as the original model would have made them, but actually perfect simulacra forever radiant with their own fascination. But this death of the divine referential has to be exorcised at all cost.

   It can be seen that the iconoclasts, who are often accused of despising and denying images, were in fact the ones who accorded them their actual worth, unlike the iconolaters, who saw in them only reflections and were content to venerate God at one remove. But the converse can also be said, namely that the iconolaters possesed the most modern and adventurous minds, since, underneath the idea of the apparition of God in the mirror of images, they already enacted his death and his disappearance in the epiphany of his representations (which they perhaps knew no longer represented anything, and that they were purely a game, but that this was precisely the greatest game — knowing also that it is dangerous to unmask images, since they dissimulate the fact that there is nothing behind them).

   This was the approach of the Jesuits, who based their politics on the virtual disappearance of God and on the worldly and spectacular manipulation of consciences — the evanescence of God in the epiphany of power — the end of transcendence, which no longer serves as alibi for a strategy completely free of influences and signs. Behind the baroque of images hides the grey eminence of politics.

   Thus perhaps at stake has always been the murderous capacity of images: murderers of the real; murderers of their own model as the Byzantine icons could murder the divine identity. To this murderous capacity is opposed the dialectical capacity of representations as a visible and intelligible mediation of the real. All of Western faith and good faith was engaged in this wager on representation: that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could exchange for meamng and that something could guarantee this exchangeGod, of course. But what if God himself can be simulated, that is to say, reduced to the signs which attest his existence? Then the whole system becomes weightless; it is no longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum: not unreal, but a simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an umnterrupted circuit without reference or circumference

   So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental ax~om). Conversely, simulation starts from the Utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum.

   These would be the successive phases of the image:

   1. It is the reflection of a basic reality.
   2. It masks and perverts a basic reality.
   3. It masks the absence of a basic reality.
   4. It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.

   In the first case, the image is a good appearance: the representation is of the order of sacrament. In the second, it is an evil appearance: of the order of malefice. In the third, it plays at being an appearance: it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer in the order of appearance at all, but of simulation.

   The transition from signs which dissimulate something to signs which dissimulate that there is nothing, marks the decisive turning pomt. The first implies a theology of truth and secrecy (to which the notmn of ideology still belongs). The second inaugurates an age of simulacra and simulation, in which there is no longer any God to recognize his own, nor any last judgement to separate truth from false, the real from its art)ficial resurrection, since everything is already dead and risen in advance.

   When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. There is an escalation of the true, of the lived experience; a resurrection of the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared. And there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production. This is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us: a strategy of the real, neo-real and hyperreal, whose universal double is a strategy of deterrence.

   (link)

   Deterrence from what? Baudrillard continues:

   Hyperreal and imaginary

   Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulation. To begin with it is a play of illusions and phantasms: pirates, the frontier, future world, etc. This imaginary world is supposed to be what makes the operation successful. But, what draws the crowds is undoubtedly much more the social microcosm, the miniaturized and religious revelling in real America, in its delights and drawbacks. You park outside, queue up inside, and are totally abandoned at the exit. In this imaginary world the only phantasmagoria is in the inherent warmth and affection of the crowd, and in that aufficiently excessive number of gadgets used there to specifically maintain the multitudinous affect. The contrast with the absolute solitude of the parking lot — a veritable concentration camp — is total. Or rather: inside, a whole range of gadgets magnetize the crowd into direct flows; outside, solitude is directed onto a single gadget: the automobile. By an extraordinary coincidence (one that undoubtedly belongs to the peculiar enchantment of this universe), this deep-frozen infantile world happens to have been conceived and realized by a man who is himself now cryogenized; Walt Disney, who awaits his resurrection at minus 180 degrees centigrade.

   The objective profile of the United States, then, may be traced throughout Disneyland, even down to the morphology of individuals and the crowd. All its values are exalted here, in miniature and comic-strip form. Embalmed and pactfied. Whence the possibility of an ideological analysis of Disneyland (L. Marin does it well in Utopies, jeux d’espaces): digest of the American way of life, panegyric to American values, idealized transposition of a contradictory reality. To be sure. But this conceals something else, and that “ideological” blanket exactly serves to cover over a third-order simulation: Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the “real” country, all of “real” America, which is Disneyland (just as prisons are there to conceal the fact that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, which is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle.

   The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real. Whence the debility, the infantile degeneration of this imaginary. It ~s meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us believe that the adults are elsewhere, in the “real” world, and to conceal the fact that real childishness is everywhere, particularly among those adults who go there to act the child in order to foster illusions of their real childishness.

   Moreover, Disneyland is not the only one. Enchanted Village, Magic Mountain, Marine World: Los Angeles is encircled by these “imaginary stations” which feed reality, reality-energy, to a town whose mystery is precisely that it is nothing more than a network of endless, unreal circulation: a town of fabulous proportions, but without space or dimensions. As much as electrical and nuclear power stations, as much as film studios, this town, which is nothing more than an immense script and a perpetual motion picture, needs this old imaginary made up of childhood signals and faked phantasms for its sympathetic nervous system.

   How more “Hollywood” or descriptive of “Americana” could the script or story of The DaVinci Code get? Remember the line: “It’s like the French FBI” when the eenspechtor confronted Hanks’ character at the equally self-referential to the whole “Davinci code lemonade stand” in the form of a cinimatically portrayed book signing? I ask, from where did the popularity of this book, and now movie, come?

   I highly recommend reading this excerpt of Simulacra and Simulations on the exact same day as you may come to find yourself screening The DaVinci Code. Read it before and after.

10. Jenny Says:
    May 21st, 2006 at 8:30 am

    I’ll be honest. I can never see Tom Hanks without expecting him to exclaim “Krakhozia!” at any given moment. The Terminal ruined his image for me, heh.

11. djk Says:
    May 21st, 2006 at 1:20 pm

    tim, you say that you’re more convinced this movie is an attack on Christianity and ask if such an attack on is warrented. of course. why should this subject be exempt? everyone and everything is fair game in art (even bad art like this). the question is, why shouldn’t it be attacked? what makes people twitch around certain subjects? if they’re not afraid of finding out they’re wrong about something, then it seems it’s pure anger (like the Muslims) that drives them into the streets to protest. which, of course, don’t sound very Christian-like.

12. It’s Only Fiction, After All - Pop Occulture Says:
    May 21st, 2006 at 2:08 pm

    […] I found a LiveJournal blogger yesterday who I think has perfectly crystallized one of the streams of thought regarding this movie and book. It has to do with how could people take it so seriously (protests, etc), since it’s “only” a work of fiction, after all: GET OVER IT PEOPLE, THE DA VINCI CODE IS A FUCKING MOVIE! A MOVIE! NOT SCRIPTURE! NOT LAW! NOT ANYTHING MORE THAN A HOLLYWOOD MOVIE OF A WORK OF FICTION!!!!! […]

13. alistair Says:
    May 21st, 2006 at 2:38 pm

    it`s a protest about control of the media. the way to people`s minds.