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That Slimy Underbelly



Interesting point made by Jason Godesky about anarcho-primitivism on the comments to my recent post:

As this episode highlighted, there is a definite slimy underbelly to it, an inevitably misanthropic connotation that can be derived. So what do we do? Ignore the facts? Pretend that growth can continue indefinitely in a finite universe? Or do we face the fact that we’re just as subject to physical limits as reindeer in the Bering Sea, and try to find some way to cope with the implications of that? I think that primitivism can be the most life-affirming, humanistic view possible, but you’re absolutely right that there is a danger there, as well. That’s one of the ongoing issues we try to navigate at Anthropik: how to come to terms with what we’ve done, and the implications of that.

On the one hand, Jason’s arguments against civilization seem to be predicated entirely on the “slimy underbelly” misanthropic aspects of civilization. Based on those alone, primitivists seem all too content to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Yet, at the same time they openly recognize that their own philosophy also carries extremely dangerous baggage. One would think that they would apply the same critical zeal they used against civilization in constructing their arguments to also toss out as unworthy any subsequent replacement philosophy which had such negative effects as well. And yet they do not. Why?

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13 Reader Responses

  1. chutney Says:

    Because they’re already right, silly.

  2. Chris Says:

    Wow, end of story, our good friends at Anthropik have already discovered all the reasons behind the world’s ills and how to solve them. Thanks for reminding us of that fact, chutney.

  3. Tim Boucher Says:

    I didn’t actually post this to make fun of them so much as I hoped to open a conversation about perceived logical inconsistencies within philosophical platforms. They are certainly not exclusive in having them, as I know I am certainly rife with them myself. I think it is actually at these points of perceived paradox and weakness that our hidden strengths and solutions probably lie, if we can bear to look at them closely!

  4. alistair Says:

    the human condition is rife with paradox. we life at the bottom of a well with crap poured in on us constantly from the time we are born. then when our hormones are at thier most virulent, we are cut free to fend for ourselves with our ill-concieved ideas about how things really work, in an environment bent on cutting our balls off. the amazing thing is that our parents did the same thing, by the seat of thier pants, and thier parents before them………..it`s a sort of running generational joke to see if the progeny will be deprived of thier genitalia before bringing the next version to bear.
    and what do you tell your kids?

  5. Jason Godesky Says:

    I was going to post this in the “flame war” thread, but I see it’s much more needed here.

    What is the “baby” we should be careful to not throw out here? Is it art? Medicine? These are universals, shared by all human cultures. As I argued in thesis #22, Western medicine is simply our own ethnomedicine. We, like the people of any culture, believe our medicine to be the most effective and all others to be mere superstition, but this is mere ethnocentrism. The simple fact of the matter is that a shaman in the jungles of Peru has the same sort of success rate with his patients as a modern doctor in a good hospital. In thesis #24 I discussed the profundity of “primitive” art, easily on par with our own. For example, though unwritten, Pygmy songs have for millennia maintained a polyphonic complexity that Europe was unable to rival until the 14th century. Or is it knowledge? Surely, civilization has given us knowledge we would not otherwise have…? Again, not really; in thesis #23, I touched on some of the immense indigenous knowledge we dispensed with at the beginning of the civilized project. We’ve gradually worked our way back to about where we started, so the whole thing’s something of a wash. Robert Wolff’s Original Wisdom is the type of book I’d think Pop Occulture readers could appreciate, though I personally prefer David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous.

    So what is the “baby” here? Philosophy? Theology? Religion? See Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher, but I would stack the Australian Dreamtime against Augustine’s Civitas Dei for theological or philosophical depth any day of the week. These are the things we usually mean if we say “civilization,” in any kind of positive sense. But these are human universals. Of course, we hold our own as superior to all others, whether in medicine or art or philosophy, but this is simple ethnocentrism. Is there any meaningful sense in which we can use “civilization”?

    Some people have tried to make “civilization” a mere synonym for “culture,” but I don’t think this works. Do we feel comfortable talking about an “Inuit civilization” or a “Pygmy civilization”? Perhaps the most open-minded of us, but I think in general most of us find a certain discomfort with those phrases. In thesis #13, I explored the issue of what civilization is, and I wrote:

    Etymologically, the origins of the word “civilization” lay in the Latin word civis, often translated as “city,” but perhaps more accurately translated as “city-state.” The Roman Empire was a patchwork of civitates, fulfilling a role not terribly far removed from states in the U.S., though the Roman Empire was less influenced by notions of Cartesian space and more interested in spheres of influence. The Roman Empire was, in fact, a hierarchy of such smaller imperial dominions; the Pater familias was emperor of his family, and the magistrate was the emperor of his civitas. Strictly speaking, a civis was the “citizen” of such a civitas, but the word was also applied to the sense of “city-ness,” as well as the city itself.

    Etymology, then, gives us our first workable definition: “civilization” is a culture of cities.

    I then went through the primary criteria of civilization defined by anthropologist Vere Gordon Childe, and argued that they actually caused one another. In other words, they’re a package deal; it takes very exceptional circumstances to have just one or two of the five criteria, without the rest following. So we’re talking about a very special kind of culture when we refer to a civilization: it’s a culture with cities, and all that comes with that. Hierarchy. Specialization. Wealth and poverty. Social classes. The state.

    Have I redefined “civilization” here arbitrarily? Is this merely a game of semantics? I don’t think so. We use the word without much thought, but we still feel uncomfortable calling some societies “civilizations,” even though they clearly have cultures. I don’t think this is a semantic game or a redefinition at all; rather, I think this is trying to pin down this elusive phrase to something more precise. This has a great deal of value, because we are talking about a discernable system, and we must understand what it is that defines that system–what makes it uniquely itself, what makes it different from the rest.

    So, where is the “baby” we’re in danger of throwing out with the “bathwater”? The “slimy underbelly” is all the civilization is. It doesn’t have any redeeming part. There is no baby. What’s worth saving–art, music, philosophy, medicine, knowledge, etc.–are things universal to all human cultures. The only things unique to civilizations–the things that make them, civilizations–are the patterns of control and domination. That’s all they are.

    That’s the first thing we need to understand, that all the good things we associate with civilization are uiversal, shared by all cultures, civilized and uncivilized alike. They’re all far, far older than civilization. They belong to humanity, not to civilization.

    The second thing we need to understand is what a bizarre aberration civilization truly is. The Agricultural Revolution was a mere 10,000 years ago, but the genus Homo has been around for some two million years. So, civilization has only existed for the last 0.5% of our time on this planet. To use the analogy Jared Diamond drew in his famous “Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race” (agriculture):

    Suppose that an archaeologist who had visited from outer space were trying to explain human history to his fellow spacelings. He might illustrate the results of his digs by a 24-hour clock on which one hour represents 100,000 years of real past time. If the history of the human race began at midnight, then we would now be almost at the end of our first day. We lived as hunter-gatherers for nearly the whole of that day, from midnight through dawn, noon, and sunset. Finally, at 11:54 p. m. we adopted agriculture.

    And for most of the time that civilization has existed, it has not been the dominant system. Foragers continue to survive even today, flourishing in ecologies where our agriculture is utterly useless. The spread of civilization has never been voluntary. We do not have one example of any forager culture willingly adopting agriculture–ever. Yet we have example after example after example of foragers who fought to the death against it, who would rather die that to submit to civilization. As J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur wrote in his Letters from an American Farmer:

    There must be in the Indians’ social bond something singularly captivating, and far superior to be boasted of among us; for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of those Aborigines having from choice become Europeans! There must be something very bewitching in their manners, something very indelible and marked by the very hands of Nature. For, take a young Indian lad, give him the best education you possibly can, load him with your bounty, with presents, nay with riches, yet he would secretly long for his native woods, which you would imagine he must have long since forgot; and on the first opportunity he can possibly find, you will see him voluntarily leave behind all you have given him and return with inexpressable joy to lie on the mats of his fathers.

    Or, as Benjamin Franklin put more succinctly:

    No European who has tasted Savage life can afterwards bear to live in our societies.

    Sitting Bull could easily see why, of course:

    White men like to dig in the ground for their food. My people prefer to hunt the buffalo as their fathers did. White men like to stay in one place. My people want to move their tepees here and there to the different hunting grounds. The life of white men is slavery. They are prisoners in towns or farms. The life my people want is a life of freedom. I have seen nothing that a white man has, houses or railways or clothing or food, that is as good as the right to move in the open country, and live in our own fashion. … The white men had many things that we wanted, but we could see that they did not have the one thing we liked best—freedom. I would rather live in a tepee and go without meat when game is scarce, than give up my privileges as a free Indian, even though I could have all that white men have.

    Or, as Daniel Quinn put it so well:

    Kids of all ages run off to join the circus. No one runs off to join Disney World.

    In other words, civilization has been experienced as so deeply dehumanizing by everyone at all times in all places that in 10,000 years, no one has ever gone to it voluntarily. Indeed, civilization has expanded to new cultures only on pain of death. That’s how much it was hated by those who knew what another way of life was like. This is where primitivism comes from: an appreciation for uncivilized life. In truth, most primitivists do not spend much time on collapse. Authors like Daniel Quinn, John Zerzan or Derrick Jensen see civilization in primarily ideological terms, as a system of belief. Jensen and Zerzan see civilization as something that must be violently toppled; Quinn sees it as a mindset that needs to be out-taught so that it will slowly fade away (his concept of “Beyond Civilization” is, like Richard Heinberg’s “Powerdown,” our most optimistic possibilities, I think).

    In many ways, I was one of the first primitivists to bring collapse into the picture. The foregoing facts were first brought to my attention by Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael. Inspired by his optimistic vision, I pushed further, asking how large groups become swayed to new ideas. That line of inquiry deflated any hope I once held for Quinn’s scenario.

    Because culture is anything but arbitrary. It’s the means by which we adapt to a given environment, the way that a computer’s operating system adapts software for a given set of hardware. The human brain is ready-made for culture: our disgust reaction, for example, is felt very deeply and strongly (as it has to be), but what disgusts us is very cultural. We absorb our cultures in an incredibly deep and profound way. There are cultures that see different colors, and cultures that cannot connect photographs to their three-dimensional subjects. That’s how deep and powerful culture is.

    Every culture has some amount of complexity. As Joseph Tainter writes in Collapse of Complex Societies:

    Complexity is generally understood to refer to such things as the size of a society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialized social roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole. Augmenting any of these dimensions increases the complexity of a society. Hunter-gatherer societies (by way of illustrating one contrast in complexity) contain no more than a few dozen distinct social personalities, while modern European censuses recognize 10,000 to 20,000 unique occupational roles, and industrial societies may contain overall more than 1,000,000 different kinds of social personalities. …

    As a simple illustration of differences in complexity, Julian Steward pointed out the contrast between the native peoples of western North America, among whom early ethnographers documented 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements, and the U.S. Army, which landed 500,000+ artifact types at Casablanca in World War 11 (Steward 1955). Complexity is quantifiable.

    But Tainter also pops the notion that there is a natural tendency towards greater complexity.

    The conventional view has been that human societies have a latent tendency towards greater complexity. Complexity was assumed to be a desirable thing, and the logical result of surplus food, leisure time, and human creativity. Although this scenario is popular, it is inadequate to explain the evolution of complexity. In the world of cultural complexity there is, to use a colloquial expression, no free lunch. More complex societies are costlier to maintain than simpler ones and require higher support levels per capita. A society that is more complex has more sub-groups and social roles, more networks among groups and individuals, more horizontal and vertical controls, higher flow of information, greater centralization of information, more specialization, and greater interdependence of parts. Increasing any of these dimensions requires biological, mechanical, or chemical energy. In the days before fossil fuel subsidies, increasing the complexity of a society usually meant that the majority of its population had to work harder.

    Tainter takes this farther: complexity is a function of energy.

    Human societies and political organizations, like all living systems, are maintained by a continuous flow of energy. From the simplest familial unit to the most complex regional hierarchy, the institutions and patterned interactions that comprise a human society are dependent on energy. At the same time, the mechanisms by which human groups acquire and distribute basic resources are conditioned by, and integrated within, sociopolitical institutions. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization are opposites sides of an equation. Neither can exist, in a human group, without the other, nor can either undergo substantial change without altering both the opposite member and the balance of the equation. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization must evolve in harmony.

    Not only is energy flow required to maintain a sociopolitical system, but the amount of energy must be sufficient for the complexity of that system. Leslie White observed a number of years ago that cultural evolution was intricately linked to the quantities of energy harvested by a human population. The amounts of energy required per capita to maintain the simplest human institutions are incredibly small compared with those needed by the most complex. White once estimated that a cultural system activated primarily by human energy could generate only about 1/20 horsepower per capita per year. This contrasts sharply with the hundreds to thousands of horsepower at the command of members of industrial societies. Cultural complexity varies accordingly. Julian Steward pointed out the quantitative difference between the 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements early anthropologists documented for the native populations of western North America, and the more than 500,000 artifact types that U.S. military forces landed at Casa Blanca in World War II.

    More complex societies are more costly to maintain than simpler ones, requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is processed, there is more centralization of information flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production, and the like. All this complexity is dependent upon energy flow at a scale vastly greater than that characterizing small groups of self-sufficient foragers or agriculturalists. The result is that as a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs on each individual will also rise, so that the population as a whole must allocate increasing portions of its energy budget to maintaining organizational institutions. This is an immutable fact of societal evolution, and is not mitigated by type of energy source.

    This leads to Tainter’s central thesis, that complexity is subject to diminishing returns, and that it is this course of diminishing returns which is the ultimate cause of all collapse, regardless of the proximate cause. He reinforces his idea with examples of collapse from the archaeological record, as well as the modern Ik in Uganda. I have summarized his arguments in my own thesis #14. Tainter argues that collapse is an economizing process that happens when the alternative is no longer tolerable. But Tainter believes we cannot collapse, because we are enmeshed in a peer polity system. Of course, peer polity systems have collapsed before–see the Maya–but the only difference is, they do not collapse as individual states, but as a peer polity system. Either they all collapse at once, or no one does. In thesis #15, I break with Tainter by applying his own model to our current situation, and concluding that we are past the point of diminishing returns for our complexity–and thus, poised for collapse.

    What does it mean to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity? It means inventions come more slowly, and when they do come, they’re less revolutionary. It means that a new bureaucracy is more likely to create red tape than actually accomplish something. It means that our means of solving problems are diminished, even as the pace and severity of our problems–exacerbated by the high energy needs of our complexity–is increasing. I know it’s tempting to pin the blame for what happened to New Orleans last year on Bush’s incompetence, but the fact of the matter is that we cannot expect to handle the situation as well as Galveston did in 1900. In 1900, we were not yet past the point of diminishing returns. Today, we are. That is the difference between Galveston and New Orleans–that’s what it means to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity. It means you can no longer solve some of the problems you used to be able to solve. It means solutions become harder and more expensive, while the energy demands rise higher and higher.

    Eventually, people begin to realize that they can get the same effect, for less energy, by living in a simpler manner. But complexity is a unified phenomenon. Tainter again:

    A society increasing in complexity does so as a system. That is to say, as some of its interlinked parts are forced in a direction of growth, others must adjust accordingly. For example, if complexity increases to regulate regional subsistence production, investments will be made in hierarchy, in bureaucracy, and in agricultural facilities (such as irrigation networks). The expanding hierarchy requires still further agricultural output for its own needs, as well as increased investment in energy and minerals extraction. An expanded military is needed to protect the assets thus created, requiring in turn its own sphere of agricultural and other resources. As more and more resources are drained from the support population to maintain this system, an increased share must be allocated to legitimization or coercion. This increased complexity requires specialized administrators, who consume further shares of subsistence resources and wealth. To maintain the productive capacity of the base population, further investment is made in agriculture, and so on.

    The illustration could be expanded, tracing still further the interdependencies within such a growing system, but the point has been made: a society grows in complexity as a system. To be sure, there are instances where one sector of a society grows at the expense of others, but to be maintained as a cohesive whole, a social system can tolerate only certain limits to such conditions.

    Thus, it is possible to speak of sociocultural evolution by the encompassing term ‘complexity,’ meaning by this the interlinked growth of the several subsystems that comprise a society.

    In growth, complexity takes on a life of its own: more complexity yields still more complexity. In collapse, the same happens in reverse. In “thesis #20, I compared collapse to a run on an over-evaluated stock.

    The process of catabolic collapse becomes self-reinforcing, as individuals decide that further complexity is not a worthwhile investment and refuse to make further investments, which makes the prospect even less attractive to other individuals. In the same manner as a “run” on a given company’s stock, the process of catabolic collapse snowballs quickly, until support for a complex society drops so low that that society can no longer be maintained. A “freefall” of lowering complexity follows, until it reaches a level where the marginal returns for it have become favorable again, and people are willing to invest in it again.

    With complexity, we get to a more precise understanding of “civilization” than the mere “city culture” we left with before. Civilization is a culture with a unique problem-solving strategy. Its answer to every problem is to increase complexity. To invent something, or appoint someone, or establish a committee, or research something, or run some tests. We are caught in a growth cycle of ever-increasing complexity requiring ever-increasing energy, and creating an ever-larger scale society. We are already far beyond any reasonable human scale society. This is the root of that alienation that has been universally feared and hated in civilization since its very beginning. And by its very nature, civilization can only get worse.

    So we see why civilization is inherently unsustainable: it is, at its most basic root, a culture in growth. It is among cultures what a cancer is among cells. It grows without limit, without regard to the other systems it is enmeshed in and coexists with, largely–I understand you’re familiar with David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous and have mentioned it here before?–because we no longer recognize ourselves as part of it. In the very same manner, cancer cells grow without limit because they have begun to unravel their telomeres–they can no longer recognize healthy cells as part of the same body. As Kenneth Boulding put it:

    Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist.

    If growth ever stops, or even slows down, our civilization–which depends on exponential growth to survive–will collapse. Our civilization will collapse. How could it be otherwise? The alternative would be to believe that infinite growth is possible in a finite world. “Sustainable growth” is an oxymoron, and there’s one thing all unsustainable systems have in common: they’re never sustained. I’m laying the tautologies on heavy here to make a point: the collapse of our civilization is not in question. It is tautological. Just the same as the reindeer of St. Matthew’s Island had no choice about whether their population would crash, so, too, are we well beyond the point where anything can be done to change our fate. I don’t know if people have free will or not (we’ve certainly never shown any evidence of that in our past), but I do believe in cause and effect. If we did have a chance to go a different way and avoid this, it was not in any of our lifetimes: it was 10,000 years ago, when we decided to plant some wheat rather than follow the herds anymore. Since then, the only choice we’ve had is how, and when, we want to face the consequences of that.

    For 10,000 years, we’ve consistently decided that “when” should be “later.” We’ve come to the brink of collapse a few times, enough to notice the pattern. Sometimes, a deus ex machina will come to save us at the last minute (though, more often, it doesn’t). All the previous collapses were staved off by technologies or possiblities that were already there, but considered too expensive or low-quality to bother with, until the crisis deepened. It’s unclear whether we have any such possibilities to save us ths time–solar might, but that’s questionable. We may have finally run out of delays. But the other thing we’ve learned from these near misses is that each reprieve gives us more time to grow, and that growth puts us in an even worse position the next time collapse looms. Had we collapsed in the Bronze Age, it would have killed millions, and devastated the Mediterranean. Now there are billions of us, and we’ve devastated the whole world. What will happen if we miss this, too? Trillions, and the extinction of all life on this planet? We’re in the midst of the worst mass extinction the earth has ever seen, and it’s being driven entirely by us–or, more accurately, because such an intensely complex civilization as ours, and still growing, cannot afford to share the world with much of anything else.

    This is why I have so little optimism for plans like Quinn’s or Heinberg’s. Either they will be too little, too late, and have no effect, or they will have an effect, which will be to make a significant dent on our constant growth. After all, logically, any system is either growing or not growing–there is no third, intermediate option. Either such gradual schemes will do nothing to stop our growth and be useless, or they will be effective in slowing our growth, which will then escalate into more and more withdrawal. Such plans have a choice between being completely ineffective, or causing the collapse they seek to avoid.

    Of course, I doubt they’ll do that. Humans are good at making up stories, and we make up stories that make us feel better all the time, to justify things we know can’t be sustained. We won’t want to pass up the possibilities to have more energy and more things, so we’re more likely to run into collapse at a full tilt.

    So, what are the implications of all this? Is this misanthropic? I think it is not misanthropic at all. After all, to explain why humans have so many problems in civilizaton, we need to invent stories like original sin: humans are innately bad, and that’s why we always feel so ill at ease in the civilization G-d destined us to build. That’s why we chafe under our rightful leaders. That’s why we feel vaguely unfulfilled and alienated by our glorious complexity. How is this not misanthropic? Rather, primitivism says that it isn’t humans who are the problem, but civilization, and one of the worst problems with it, is that it is so deeply dehumanizing. Primtiivism suggests that freedom and equality are the natural human condition–human nature. It suggests that we chafe under leaders because humans don’t want or need leaders; that we feel alienated in large-scale society, because large-scale society doesn’t serve human needs. It turns humans into cogs; primitivism builds communities for people.

    The violent elements of primitivism are not the ones who embrace collapse, but those who don’t, those like Zerzan or Jensen who believe that ideology exists independent of physical reality, and that civilization must be violently destroyed or it will perpetuate itself forever.

    So what do we do?

    Collapse is inevitable. It’s actually the best thing that can happen to us now (which tells us just how terrible a situation we’re really in). One way or another, voluntarily or not, with our awarness or not, this brief experiment is coming to a quick and catastrophic end. How do we deal with that?

    That’s the really big question. How do we deal with that? How do we cope with that?

    You say that understanding this provides a place for true misanthropes to air a disturbing lack of compassion, and as we’ve seen, that’s absolutely true. My question is … so what? Darwin provided the same, didn’t he? The Nazi party owed much of its foundation to certain philosophical notions of race and society derived, ultimately, from the theory of evolution. Should the possibility that some people will cope with an unpleasant truth poorly convince us not to believe what the facts so clearly indicate? Should we reject natural selection and evolution for the same reason?

    Primitivism brings with it a truth as unpleasant as evolution, but just as undeniably true. People will react poorly to it, but that says nothing as to whether or not it is true. Rather than “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” and rejecting the basic fact that civilization is unsustainable simply because some might be led to misanthropic implications, I think we should instead fight against those implications, and argue all the more forcefully for the preservation of our humanity in the last death throes of such a dehumanizing, murderous force. Civilization cannot be sustained; no system based on infinite growth ever can be. We cannot afford to allow the road beyond civilization to lay in the hands of misanthropes and terrorists. For the sake of our species, we cannot.

  6. Jason Godesky Says:

    What is the “baby” we should be careful to not throw out [with the bathwater] here? Is it art? Medicine? These are universals, shared by all human cultures. As I argued in thesis #22, Western medicine is simply our own ethnomedicine. We, like the people of any culture, believe our medicine to be the most effective and all others to be mere superstition, but this is mere ethnocentrism. The simple fact of the matter is that a shaman in the jungles of Peru has the same sort of success rate with his patients as a modern doctor in a good hospital. In thesis #24 I discussed the profundity of “primitive” art, easily on par with our own. For example, though unwritten, Pygmy songs have for millennia maintained a polyphonic complexity that Europe was unable to rival until the 14th century. Or is it knowledge? Surely, civilization has given us knowledge we would not otherwise have…? Again, not really; in thesis #23, I touched on some of the immense indigenous knowledge we dispensed with at the beginning of the civilized project. We’ve gradually worked our way back to about where we started, so the whole thing’s something of a wash. Robert Wolff’s Original Wisdom is the type of book I’d think Pop Occulture readers could appreciate, though I personally prefer David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous.

    So what is the “baby” here? Philosophy? Theology? Religion? See Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher, but I would stack the Australian Dreamtime against Augustine’s Civitas Dei for theological or philosophical depth any day of the week. These are the things we usually mean if we say “civilization,” in any kind of positive sense. But these are human universals. Of course, we hold our own as superior to all others, whether in medicine or art or philosophy, but this is simple ethnocentrism. Is there any meaningful sense in which we can use “civilization”?

    Some people have tried to make “civilization” a mere synonym for “culture,” but I don’t think this works. Do we feel comfortable talking about an “Inuit civilization” or a “Pygmy civilization”? Perhaps the most open-minded of us, but I think in general most of us find a certain discomfort with those phrases. In thesis #13, I explored the issue of what civilization is, and I wrote:

    Etymologically, the origins of the word “civilization” lay in the Latin word civis, often translated as “city,” but perhaps more accurately translated as “city-state.” The Roman Empire was a patchwork of civitates, fulfilling a role not terribly far removed from states in the U.S., though the Roman Empire was less influenced by notions of Cartesian space and more interested in spheres of influence. The Roman Empire was, in fact, a hierarchy of such smaller imperial dominions; the Pater familias was emperor of his family, and the magistrate was the emperor of his civitas. Strictly speaking, a civis was the “citizen” of such a civitas, but the word was also applied to the sense of “city-ness,” as well as the city itself.

    Etymology, then, gives us our first workable definition: “civilization” is a culture of cities.

    I then went through the primary criteria of civilization defined by anthropologist Vere Gordon Childe, and argued that they actually caused one another. In other words, they’re a package deal; it takes very exceptional circumstances to have just one or two of the five criteria, without the rest following. So we’re talking about a very special kind of culture when we refer to a civilization: it’s a culture with cities, and all that comes with that. Hierarchy. Specialization. Wealth and poverty. Social classes. The state.

    Have I redefined “civilization” here arbitrarily? Is this merely a game of semantics? I don’t think so. We use the word without much thought, but we still feel uncomfortable calling some societies “civilizations,” even though they clearly have cultures. I don’t think this is a semantic game or a redefinition at all; rather, I think this is trying to pin down this elusive phrase to something more precise. This has a great deal of value, because we are talking about a discernable system, and we must understand what it is that defines that system—what makes it uniquely itself, what makes it different from the rest.

    So, where is the “baby” we’re in danger of throwing out with the “bathwater”? The “slimy underbelly” is all that civilization is. It doesn’t have any redeeming part. There is no baby. What’s worth saving—art, music, philosophy, medicine, knowledge, etc.—are things universal to all human cultures. The only things unique to civilizations—the things that make them civilizations—are the patterns of control and domination. That’s all they are.

    That’s the first thing we need to understand, that all the good things we associate with civilization are uiversal, shared by all cultures, civilized and uncivilized alike. They’re all far, far older than civilization. They belong to humanity, not to civilization.

    The second thing we need to understand is what a bizarre aberration civilization truly is. The Agricultural Revolution was a mere 10,000 years ago, but the genus Homo has been around for some two million years. So, civilization has only existed for the last 0.5% of our time on this planet. To use the analogy Jared Diamond drew in his famous “The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race” (agriculture):

    Suppose that an archaeologist who had visited from outer space were trying to explain human history to his fellow spacelings. He might illustrate the results of his digs by a 24-hour clock on which one hour represents 100,000 years of real past time. If the history of the human race began at midnight, then we would now be almost at the end of our first day. We lived as hunter-gatherers for nearly the whole of that day, from midnight through dawn, noon, and sunset. Finally, at 11:54 p. m. we adopted agriculture.

    And for most of the time that civilization has existed, it has not been the dominant system. Foragers continue to survive even today, flourishing in ecologies where our agriculture is utterly useless. The spread of civilization has never been voluntary. We do not have one example of any forager culture willingly adopting agriculture—ever. Yet we have example after example after example of foragers who fought to the death against it, who would rather die that to submit to civilization. As J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur wrote in his Letters from an American Farmer:

    There must be in the Indians’ social bond something singularly captivating, and far superior to be boasted of among us; for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of those Aborigines having from choice become Europeans! There must be something very bewitching in their manners, something very indelible and marked by the very hands of Nature. For, take a young Indian lad, give him the best education you possibly can, load him with your bounty, with presents, nay with riches, yet he would secretly long for his native woods, which you would imagine he must have long since forgot; and on the first opportunity he can possibly find, you will see him voluntarily leave behind all you have given him and return with inexpressable joy to lie on the mats of his fathers.

    Or, as Benjamin Franklin put more succinctly:

    No European who has tasted Savage life can afterwards bear to live in our societies.

    Sitting Bull could easily see why, of course:

    White men like to dig in the ground for their food. My people prefer to hunt the buffalo as their fathers did. White men like to stay in one place. My people want to move their tepees here and there to the different hunting grounds. The life of white men is slavery. They are prisoners in towns or farms. The life my people want is a life of freedom. I have seen nothing that a white man has, houses or railways or clothing or food, that is as good as the right to move in the open country, and live in our own fashion. … The white men had many things that we wanted, but we could see that they did not have the one thing we liked best—freedom. I would rather live in a tepee and go without meat when game is scarce, than give up my privileges as a free Indian, even though I could have all that white men have.

    Or, as Daniel Quinn put it so well:

    Kids of all ages run off to join the circus. No one runs off to join Disney World.

    In other words, civilization has been experienced as so deeply dehumanizing by everyone at all times in all places that in 10,000 years, no one has ever gone to it voluntarily. Indeed, civilization has expanded to new cultures only on pain of death. That’s how much it was hated by those who knew what another way of life was like. This is where primitivism comes from: an appreciation for uncivilized life. In truth, most primitivists do not spend much time on collapse. Authors like Daniel Quinn, John Zerzan or Derrick Jensen see civilization in primarily ideological terms, as a system of belief. Jensen and Zerzan see civilization as something that must be violently toppled; Quinn sees it as a mindset that needs to be out-taught so that it will slowly fade away (his concept of “Beyond Civilization” is, like Richard Heinberg’s “Powerdown,” one of our most optimistic possibilities, I think).

    In many ways, I was one of the first primitivists to bring collapse into the picture. The foregoing facts were first brought to my attention by Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael. Inspired by his optimistic vision, I pushed further, asking how large groups become swayed to new ideas. That line of inquiry deflated any hope I once held for Quinn’s scenario.

    Because culture is anything but arbitrary. It’s the means by which we adapt to a given environment, the way that a computer’s operating system adapts software for a given set of hardware. The human brain is ready-made for culture: our disgust reaction, for example, is felt very deeply and strongly (as it has to be), but what disgusts us is very cultural. We absorb our cultures in an incredibly deep and profound way. There are cultures that see different colors, and cultures that cannot connect photographs to their three-dimensional subjects. That’s how deep and powerful culture is.

    Every culture has some amount of complexity. As Joseph Tainter writes in Collapse of Complex Societies:

    Complexity is generally understood to refer to such things as the size of a society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialized social roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole. Augmenting any of these dimensions increases the complexity of a society. Hunter-gatherer societies (by way of illustrating one contrast in complexity) contain no more than a few dozen distinct social personalities, while modern European censuses recognize 10,000 to 20,000 unique occupational roles, and industrial societies may contain overall more than 1,000,000 different kinds of social personalities. …

    As a simple illustration of differences in complexity, Julian Steward pointed out the contrast between the native peoples of western North America, among whom early ethnographers documented 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements, and the U.S. Army, which landed 500,000+ artifact types at Casablanca in World War 11 (Steward 1955). Complexity is quantifiable.

    But Tainter also pops the notion that there is a natural tendency towards greater complexity.

    The conventional view has been that human societies have a latent tendency towards greater complexity. Complexity was assumed to be a desirable thing, and the logical result of surplus food, leisure time, and human creativity. Although this scenario is popular, it is inadequate to explain the evolution of complexity. In the world of cultural complexity there is, to use a colloquial expression, no free lunch. More complex societies are costlier to maintain than simpler ones and require higher support levels per capita. A society that is more complex has more sub-groups and social roles, more networks among groups and individuals, more horizontal and vertical controls, higher flow of information, greater centralization of information, more specialization, and greater interdependence of parts. Increasing any of these dimensions requires biological, mechanical, or chemical energy. In the days before fossil fuel subsidies, increasing the complexity of a society usually meant that the majority of its population had to work harder.

    Tainter takes this farther: complexity is a function of energy.

    Human societies and political organizations, like all living systems, are maintained by a continuous flow of energy. From the simplest familial unit to the most complex regional hierarchy, the institutions and patterned interactions that comprise a human society are dependent on energy. At the same time, the mechanisms by which human groups acquire and distribute basic resources are conditioned by, and integrated within, sociopolitical institutions. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization are opposites sides of an equation. Neither can exist, in a human group, without the other, nor can either undergo substantial change without altering both the opposite member and the balance of the equation. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization must evolve in harmony.

    Not only is energy flow required to maintain a sociopolitical system, but the amount of energy must be sufficient for the complexity of that system. Leslie White observed a number of years ago that cultural evolution was intricately linked to the quantities of energy harvested by a human population. The amounts of energy required per capita to maintain the simplest human institutions are incredibly small compared with those needed by the most complex. White once estimated that a cultural system activated primarily by human energy could generate only about 1/20 horsepower per capita per year. This contrasts sharply with the hundreds to thousands of horsepower at the command of members of industrial societies. Cultural complexity varies accordingly. Julian Steward pointed out the quantitative difference between the 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements early anthropologists documented for the native populations of western North America, and the more than 500,000 artifact types that U.S. military forces landed at Casa Blanca in World War II.

    More complex societies are more costly to maintain than simpler ones, requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is processed, there is more centralization of information flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production, and the like. All this complexity is dependent upon energy flow at a scale vastly greater than that characterizing small groups of self-sufficient foragers or agriculturalists. The result is that as a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs on each individual will also rise, so that the population as a whole must allocate increasing portions of its energy budget to maintaining organizational institutions. This is an immutable fact of societal evolution, and is not mitigated by type of energy source.

    This leads to Tainter’s central thesis, that complexity is subject to diminishing returns, and that it is this course of diminishing returns which is the ultimate cause of all collapse, regardless of the proximate cause. He reinforces his idea with examples of collapse from the archaeological record, as well as the modern Ik in Uganda. I have summarized his arguments in my own thesis #14. Tainter argues that collapse is an economizing process that happens when the alternative is no longer tolerable. But Tainter believes we cannot collapse, because we are enmeshed in a peer polity system. Of course, peer polity systems have collapsed before—see the Maya—but the only difference is, they do not collapse as individual states, but as a peer polity system. Either they all collapse at once, or no one does. In thesis #15, I break with Tainter by applying his own model to our current situation, and concluding that we are past the point of diminishing returns for our complexity—and thus, poised for collapse.

    What does it mean to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity? It means inventions come more slowly, and when they do come, they’re less revolutionary. It means that a new bureaucracy is more likely to create red tape than actually accomplish something. It means that our means of solving problems are diminished, even as the pace and severity of our problems—exacerbated by the high energy needs of our complexity—is increasing. I know it’s tempting to pin the blame for what happened to New Orleans last year on Bush’s incompetence, but the fact of the matter is that we cannot expect to handle the situation as well as Galveston did in 1900. In 1900, we were not yet past the point of diminishing returns. Today, we are. That is the difference between Galveston and New Orleans—that’s what it means to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity. It means you can no longer solve some of the problems you used to be able to solve. It means solutions become harder and more expensive, while the energy demands rise higher and higher.

    Eventually, people begin to realize that they can get the same effect, for less energy, by living in a simpler manner. But complexity is a unified phenomenon. Tainter again:

    A society increasing in complexity does so as a system. That is to say, as some of its interlinked parts are forced in a direction of growth, others must adjust accordingly. For example, if complexity increases to regulate regional subsistence production, investments will be made in hierarchy, in bureaucracy, and in agricultural facilities (such as irrigation networks). The expanding hierarchy requires still further agricultural output for its own needs, as well as increased investment in energy and minerals extraction. An expanded military is needed to protect the assets thus created, requiring in turn its own sphere of agricultural and other resources. As more and more resources are drained from the support population to maintain this system, an increased share must be allocated to legitimization or coercion. This increased complexity requires specialized administrators, who consume further shares of subsistence resources and wealth. To maintain the productive capacity of the base population, further investment is made in agriculture, and so on.

    The illustration could be expanded, tracing still further the interdependencies within such a growing system, but the point has been made: a society grows in complexity as a system. To be sure, there are instances where one sector of a society grows at the expense of others, but to be maintained as a cohesive whole, a social system can tolerate only certain limits to such conditions.

    Thus, it is possible to speak of sociocultural evolution by the encompassing term ‘complexity,’ meaning by this the interlinked growth of the several subsystems that comprise a society.

    In growth, complexity takes on a life of its own: more complexity yields still more complexity. In collapse, the same happens in reverse. In “thesis #20, I compared collapse to a run on an over-evaluated stock.

    The process of catabolic collapse becomes self-reinforcing, as individuals decide that further complexity is not a worthwhile investment and refuse to make further investments, which makes the prospect even less attractive to other individuals. In the same manner as a “run” on a given company’s stock, the process of catabolic collapse snowballs quickly, until support for a complex society drops so low that that society can no longer be maintained. A “freefall” of lowering complexity follows, until it reaches a level where the marginal returns for it have become favorable again, and people are willing to invest in it again.

    With complexity, we get to a more precise understanding of “civilization” than the mere “city culture” we left with before. Civilization is a culture with a unique problem-solving strategy. Its answer to every problem is to increase complexity. To invent something, or appoint someone, or establish a committee, or research something, or run some tests. We are caught in a growth cycle of ever-increasing complexity requiring ever-increasing energy, and creating an ever-larger scale society. We are already far beyond any reasonable human scale society. This is the root of that alienation that has been universally feared and hated in civilization since its very beginning. And by its very nature, civilization can only get worse.

    So we see why civilization is inherently unsustainable: it is, at its most basic root, a culture in growth. It is among cultures what a cancer is among cells. It grows without limit, without regard to the other systems it is enmeshed in and coexists with, largely—I understand you’re familiar with David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous and have mentioned it here before?—because we no longer recognize ourselves as part of it. In the very same manner, cancer cells grow without limit because they have begun to unravel their telomeres—they can no longer recognize healthy cells as part of the same body. As Kenneth Boulding put it:

    Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist.

    If growth ever stops, or even slows down, our civilization—which depends on exponential growth to survive—will collapse. How could it be otherwise? The alternative would be to believe that infinite growth is possible in a finite world. “Sustainable growth” is an oxymoron, and there’s one thing all unsustainable systems have in common: they’re never sustained. I’m laying the tautologies on heavy here to make a point: the collapse of our civilization is not in question. It is tautological. Just the same as the reindeer of St. Matthew’s Island had no choice about whether their population would crash, so, too, are we well beyond the point where anything can be done to change our fate. I don’t know if people have free will or not (we’ve certainly never shown any evidence of that in our past), but I do believe in cause and effect. If we did have a chance to go a different way and avoid this, it was not in any of our lifetimes: it was 10,000 years ago, when we decided to plant some wheat rather than continue following the herds. Since then, the only choice we’ve had is how, and when, we want to face the consequences of that.

    For 10,000 years, we’ve consistently decided that “when” should be “later.” We’ve come to the brink of collapse a few times, enough to notice the pattern. Sometimes, a deus ex machina will come to save us at the last minute (though, more often, it doesn’t). All the previous collapses were staved off by technologies or possiblities that were already there, but considered too expensive or low-quality to bother with, until the crisis deepened. It’s unclear whether we have any such possibilities to save us this time—solar might, but that’s questionable. We may have finally run out of delays. But the other thing we’ve learned from these near misses is that each reprieve gives us more time to grow, and that growth puts us in an even worse position the next time collapse looms. Had we collapsed in the Bronze Age, it would have killed millions, and devastated the Mediterranean. Now there are billions of us, and we’ve devastated the whole world. What will happen if we miss this, too? Trillions, and the extinction of all life on this planet? We’re in the midst of the worst mass extinction the earth has ever seen, and it’s being driven entirely by us—or, more accurately, because such an intensely complex civilization as ours, and still growing, cannot afford to share the world with much of anything else.

    This is why I have so little optimism for plans like Quinn’s or Heinberg’s. Either they will be too little, too late, and have no effect, or they will have an effect, which will be to make a significant dent on our constant growth. After all, logically, any system is either growing or not growing—there is no third, intermediate option. Either such gradual schemes will do nothing to stop our growth and be useless, or they will be effective in slowing our growth, which will then escalate into more and more withdrawal. Such plans have a choice between being completely ineffective, or causing the collapse they seek to avoid.

    Of course, I doubt they’ll do that. Humans are good at making up stories, and we make up stories that make us feel better all the time, to justify things we know can’t be sustained. We won’t want to pass up the possibilities to have more energy and more things, so we’re more likely to run into collapse at a full tilt.

    So, what are the implications of all this? Is this misanthropic? I think it is not misanthropic at all. After all, to explain why humans have so many problems in civilizaton, we need to invent stories like original sin: humans are innately bad, and that’s why we always feel so ill at ease in the civilization G-d destined us to build. That’s why we chafe under our rightful leaders. That’s why we feel vaguely unfulfilled and alienated by our glorious complexity. How is this not misanthropic? Rather, primitivism says that it isn’t humans who are the problem, but civilization, and one of the worst problems with it is that it is so deeply dehumanizing. Primitivism suggests that freedom and equality are the natural human condition—human nature. It suggests that we chafe under leaders because humans don’t want or need leaders; that we feel alienated in large-scale society, because large-scale society doesn’t serve human needs. Civilization turns humans into cogs; primitivism builds communities for people.

    The violent elements of primitivism are not the ones who embrace collapse, but those who don’t, those like Zerzan or Jensen who believe that ideology exists independent of physical reality, and that civilization must be violently destroyed or it will perpetuate itself forever.

    So what do we do?

    Collapse is inevitable. It’s actually the best thing that can happen to us now (which tells us just how terrible a situation we’re really in). One way or another, voluntarily or not, with our awarness or not, this brief experiment is coming to a quick and catastrophic end. How do we deal with that?

    That’s the really big question. How do we deal with that? How do we cope with that?

    You say that understanding this provides a place for true misanthropes to air a disturbing lack of compassion, and as we’ve seen, that’s absolutely true. My question is … so what? Darwin provided the same, didn’t he? The Nazi party owed much of its foundation to certain philosophical notions of race and society derived, ultimately, from the theory of evolution. Should the possibility that some people will cope with an unpleasant truth poorly convince us not to believe what the facts so clearly indicate? Should we reject natural selection and evolution for the same reason?

    Primitivism brings with it a truth as unpleasant as evolution, but just as undeniably true. People will react poorly to it, but that says nothing as to whether or not it is true. Rather than “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” and rejecting the basic fact that civilization is unsustainable simply because some might be led to misanthropic implications, I think we should instead fight against those implications, and argue all the more forcefully for the preservation of our humanity in the last death throes of such a dehumanizing, murderous force. Civilization cannot be sustained; no system based on infinite growth ever can be. We cannot afford to allow the road beyond civilization to lay in the hands of misanthropes and terrorists. For the sake of our species, we cannot.

  7. Jason Godesky Says:

    What is the “baby” we should be careful to not throw out [with the bathwater] here? Is it art? Medicine? These are universals, shared by all human cultures. As I argued in thesis #22, Western medicine is simply our own ethnomedicine. We, like the people of any culture, believe our medicine to be the most effective and all others to be mere superstition, but this is mere ethnocentrism. The simple fact of the matter is that a shaman in the jungles of Peru has the same sort of success rate with his patients as a modern doctor in a good hospital. In thesis #24 I discussed the profundity of “primitive” art, easily on par with our own. For example, though unwritten, Pygmy songs have for millennia maintained a polyphonic complexity that Europe was unable to rival until the 14th century. Or is it knowledge? Surely, civilization has given us knowledge we would not otherwise have…? Again, not really; in thesis #23, I touched on some of the immense indigenous knowledge we dispensed with at the beginning of the civilized project. We’ve gradually worked our way back to about where we started, so the whole thing’s something of a wash. Robert Wolff’s Original Wisdom is the type of book I’d think Pop Occulture readers could appreciate, though I personally prefer David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous.

    So what is the “baby” here? Philosophy? Theology? Religion? See Paul Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher, but I would stack the Australian Dreamtime against Augustine’s Civitas Dei for theological or philosophical depth any day of the week. These are the things we usually mean if we say “civilization,” in any kind of positive sense. But these are human universals. Of course, we hold our own as superior to all others, whether in medicine or art or philosophy, but this is simple ethnocentrism. Is there any meaningful sense in which we can use “civilization”?

    Some people have tried to make “civilization” a mere synonym for “culture,” but I don’t think this works. Do we feel comfortable talking about an “Inuit civilization” or a “Pygmy civilization”? Perhaps the most open-minded of us, but I think in general most of us find a certain discomfort with those phrases. In thesis #13, I explored the issue of what civilization is, and I wrote:

    Etymologically, the origins of the word “civilization” lay in the Latin word civis, often translated as “city,” but perhaps more accurately translated as “city-state.” The Roman Empire was a patchwork of civitates, fulfilling a role not terribly far removed from states in the U.S., though the Roman Empire was less influenced by notions of Cartesian space and more interested in spheres of influence. The Roman Empire was, in fact, a hierarchy of such smaller imperial dominions; the Pater familias was emperor of his family, and the magistrate was the emperor of his civitas. Strictly speaking, a civis was the “citizen” of such a civitas, but the word was also applied to the sense of “city-ness,” as well as the city itself.

    Etymology, then, gives us our first workable definition: “civilization” is a culture of cities.

    I then went through the primary criteria of civilization defined by anthropologist Vere Gordon Childe, and argued that they actually caused one another. In other words, they’re a package deal; it takes very exceptional circumstances to have just one or two of the five criteria, without the rest following. So we’re talking about a very special kind of culture when we refer to a civilization: it’s a culture with cities, and all that comes with that. Hierarchy. Specialization. Wealth and poverty. Social classes. The state.

    Have I redefined “civilization” here arbitrarily? Is this merely a game of semantics? I don’t think so. We use the word without much thought, but we still feel uncomfortable calling some societies “civilizations,” even though they clearly have cultures. I don’t think this is a semantic game or a redefinition at all; rather, I think this is trying to pin down this elusive phrase to something more precise. This has a great deal of value, because we are talking about a discernable system, and we must understand what it is that defines that system—what makes it uniquely itself, what makes it different from the rest.

    So, where is the “baby” we’re in danger of throwing out with the “bathwater”? The “slimy underbelly” is all that civilization is. It doesn’t have any redeeming part. There is no baby. What’s worth saving—art, music, philosophy, medicine, knowledge, etc.—are things universal to all human cultures. The only things unique to civilizations—the things that make them civilizations—are the patterns of control and domination. That’s all they are.

    That’s the first thing we need to understand, that all the good things we associate with civilization are uiversal, shared by all cultures, civilized and uncivilized alike. They’re all far, far older than civilization. They belong to humanity, not to civilization.

  8. Jason Godesky Says:

    The second thing we need to understand is what a bizarre aberration civilization truly is. The Agricultural Revolution was a mere 10,000 years ago, but the genus Homo has been around for some two million years. So, civilization has only existed for the last 0.5% of our time on this planet. To use the analogy Jared Diamond drew in his famous “The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race” (agriculture):

    Suppose that an archaeologist who had visited from outer space were trying to explain human history to his fellow spacelings. He might illustrate the results of his digs by a 24-hour clock on which one hour represents 100,000 years of real past time. If the history of the human race began at midnight, then we would now be almost at the end of our first day. We lived as hunter-gatherers for nearly the whole of that day, from midnight through dawn, noon, and sunset. Finally, at 11:54 p. m. we adopted agriculture.

    And for most of the time that civilization has existed, it has not been the dominant system. Foragers continue to survive even today, flourishing in ecologies where our agriculture is utterly useless. The spread of civilization has never been voluntary. We do not have one example of any forager culture willingly adopting agriculture—ever. Yet we have example after example after example of foragers who fought to the death against it, who would rather die that to submit to civilization. As J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur wrote in his Letters from an American Farmer:

    There must be in the Indians’ social bond something singularly captivating, and far superior to be boasted of among us; for thousands of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of those Aborigines having from choice become Europeans! There must be something very bewitching in their manners, something very indelible and marked by the very hands of Nature. For, take a young Indian lad, give him the best education you possibly can, load him with your bounty, with presents, nay with riches, yet he would secretly long for his native woods, which you would imagine he must have long since forgot; and on the first opportunity he can possibly find, you will see him voluntarily leave behind all you have given him and return with inexpressable joy to lie on the mats of his fathers.

    Or, as Benjamin Franklin put more succinctly:

    No European who has tasted Savage life can afterwards bear to live in our societies.

    Sitting Bull could easily see why, of course:

    White men like to dig in the ground for their food. My people prefer to hunt the buffalo as their fathers did. White men like to stay in one place. My people want to move their tepees here and there to the different hunting grounds. The life of white men is slavery. They are prisoners in towns or farms. The life my people want is a life of freedom. I have seen nothing that a white man has, houses or railways or clothing or food, that is as good as the right to move in the open country, and live in our own fashion. … The white men had many things that we wanted, but we could see that they did not have the one thing we liked best—freedom. I would rather live in a tepee and go without meat when game is scarce, than give up my privileges as a free Indian, even though I could have all that white men have.

    Or, as Daniel Quinn put it so well:

    Kids of all ages run off to join the circus. No one runs off to join Disney World.

    In other words, civilization has been experienced as so deeply dehumanizing by everyone at all times in all places that in 10,000 years, no one has ever gone to it voluntarily. Indeed, civilization has expanded to new cultures only on pain of death. That’s how much it was hated by those who knew what another way of life was like. This is where primitivism comes from: an appreciation for uncivilized life. In truth, most primitivists do not spend much time on collapse. Authors like Daniel Quinn, John Zerzan or Derrick Jensen see civilization in primarily ideological terms, as a system of belief. Jensen and Zerzan see civilization as something that must be violently toppled; Quinn sees it as a mindset that needs to be out-taught so that it will slowly fade away (his concept of “Beyond Civilization” is, like Richard Heinberg’s “Powerdown,” one of our most optimistic possibilities, I think).

    In many ways, I was one of the first primitivists to bring collapse into the picture. The foregoing facts were first brought to my attention by Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael. Inspired by his optimistic vision, I pushed further, asking how large groups become swayed to new ideas. That line of inquiry deflated any hope I once held for Quinn’s scenario.

    Because culture is anything but arbitrary. It’s the means by which we adapt to a given environment, the way that a computer’s operating system adapts software for a given set of hardware. The human brain is ready-made for culture: our disgust reaction, for example, is felt very deeply and strongly (as it has to be), but what disgusts us is very cultural. We absorb our cultures in an incredibly deep and profound way. There are cultures that see different colors, and cultures that cannot connect photographs to their three-dimensional subjects. That’s how deep and powerful culture is.

  9. Jason Godesky Says:

    Every culture has some amount of complexity. As Joseph Tainter writes in Collapse of Complex Societies:

    Complexity is generally understood to refer to such things as the size of a society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialized social roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole. Augmenting any of these dimensions increases the complexity of a society. Hunter-gatherer societies (by way of illustrating one contrast in complexity) contain no more than a few dozen distinct social personalities, while modern European censuses recognize 10,000 to 20,000 unique occupational roles, and industrial societies may contain overall more than 1,000,000 different kinds of social personalities. …

    As a simple illustration of differences in complexity, Julian Steward pointed out the contrast between the native peoples of western North America, among whom early ethnographers documented 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements, and the U.S. Army, which landed 500,000+ artifact types at Casablanca in World War 11 (Steward 1955). Complexity is quantifiable.

    But Tainter also pops the notion that there is a natural tendency towards greater complexity.

    The conventional view has been that human societies have a latent tendency towards greater complexity. Complexity was assumed to be a desirable thing, and the logical result of surplus food, leisure time, and human creativity. Although this scenario is popular, it is inadequate to explain the evolution of complexity. In the world of cultural complexity there is, to use a colloquial expression, no free lunch. More complex societies are costlier to maintain than simpler ones and require higher support levels per capita. A society that is more complex has more sub-groups and social roles, more networks among groups and individuals, more horizontal and vertical controls, higher flow of information, greater centralization of information, more specialization, and greater interdependence of parts. Increasing any of these dimensions requires biological, mechanical, or chemical energy. In the days before fossil fuel subsidies, increasing the complexity of a society usually meant that the majority of its population had to work harder.

    Tainter takes this farther: complexity is a function of energy.

    Human societies and political organizations, like all living systems, are maintained by a continuous flow of energy. From the simplest familial unit to the most complex regional hierarchy, the institutions and patterned interactions that comprise a human society are dependent on energy. At the same time, the mechanisms by which human groups acquire and distribute basic resources are conditioned by, and integrated within, sociopolitical institutions. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization are opposites sides of an equation. Neither can exist, in a human group, without the other, nor can either undergo substantial change without altering both the opposite member and the balance of the equation. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization must evolve in harmony.

    Not only is energy flow required to maintain a sociopolitical system, but the amount of energy must be sufficient for the complexity of that system. Leslie White observed a number of years ago that cultural evolution was intricately linked to the quantities of energy harvested by a human population. The amounts of energy required per capita to maintain the simplest human institutions are incredibly small compared with those needed by the most complex. White once estimated that a cultural system activated primarily by human energy could generate only about 1/20 horsepower per capita per year. This contrasts sharply with the hundreds to thousands of horsepower at the command of members of industrial societies. Cultural complexity varies accordingly. Julian Steward pointed out the quantitative difference between the 3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements early anthropologists documented for the native populations of western North America, and the more than 500,000 artifact types that U.S. military forces landed at Casa Blanca in World War II.

    More complex societies are more costly to maintain than simpler ones, requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is processed, there is more centralization of information flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production, and the like. All this complexity is dependent upon energy flow at a scale vastly greater than that characterizing small groups of self-sufficient foragers or agriculturalists. The result is that as a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs on each individual will also rise, so that the population as a whole must allocate increasing portions of its energy budget to maintaining organizational institutions. This is an immutable fact of societal evolution, and is not mitigated by type of energy source.

    This leads to Tainter’s central thesis, that complexity is subject to diminishing returns, and that it is this course of diminishing returns which is the ultimate cause of all collapse, regardless of the proximate cause. He reinforces his idea with examples of collapse from the archaeological record, as well as the modern Ik in Uganda. I have summarized his arguments in my own thesis #14. Tainter argues that collapse is an economizing process that happens when the alternative is no longer tolerable. But Tainter believes we cannot collapse, because we are enmeshed in a peer polity system. Of course, peer polity systems have collapsed before—see the Maya—but the only difference is, they do not collapse as individual states, but as a peer polity system. Either they all collapse at once, or no one does. In thesis #15, I break with Tainter by applying his own model to our current situation, and concluding that we are past the point of diminishing returns for our complexity—and thus, poised for collapse.

    What does it mean to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity? It means inventions come more slowly, and when they do come, they’re less revolutionary. It means that a new bureaucracy is more likely to create red tape than actually accomplish something. It means that our means of solving problems are diminished, even as the pace and severity of our problems—exacerbated by the high energy needs of our complexity—is increasing. I know it’s tempting to pin the blame for what happened to New Orleans last year on Bush’s incompetence, but the fact of the matter is that we cannot expect to handle the situation as well as Galveston did in 1900. In 1900, we were not yet past the point of diminishing returns. Today, we are. That is the difference between Galveston and New Orleans—that’s what it means to be beyond the point of diminishing returns for complexity. It means you can no longer solve some of the problems you used to be able to solve. It means solutions become harder and more expensive, while the energy demands rise higher and higher.

    Eventually, people begin to realize that they can get the same effect, for less energy, by living in a simpler manner. But complexity is a unified phenomenon. Tainter again:

    A society increasing in complexity does so as a system. That is to say, as some of its interlinked parts are forced in a direction of growth, others must adjust accordingly. For example, if complexity increases to regulate regional subsistence production, investments will be made in hierarchy, in bureaucracy, and in agricultural facilities (such as irrigation networks). The expanding hierarchy requires still further agricultural output for its own needs, as well as increased investment in energy and minerals extraction. An expanded military is needed to protect the assets thus created, requiring in turn its own sphere of agricultural and other resources. As more and more resources are drained from the support population to maintain this system, an increased share must be allocated to legitimization or coercion. This increased complexity requires specialized administrators, who consume further shares of subsistence resources and wealth. To maintain the productive capacity of the base population, further investment is made in agriculture, and so on.

    The illustration could be expanded, tracing still further the interdependencies within such a growing system, but the point has been made: a society grows in complexity as a system. To be sure, there are instances where one sector of a society grows at the expense of others, but to be maintained as a cohesive whole, a social system can tolerate only certain limits to such conditions.

    Thus, it is possible to speak of sociocultural evolution by the encompassing term ‘complexity,’ meaning by this the interlinked growth of the several subsystems that comprise a society.

    In growth, complexity takes on a life of its own: more complexity yields still more complexity. In collapse, the same happens in reverse. In “thesis #20, I compared collapse to a run on an over-evaluated stock.

    The process of catabolic collapse becomes self-reinforcing, as individuals decide that further complexity is not a worthwhile investment and refuse to make further investments, which makes the prospect even less attractive to other individuals. In the same manner as a “run” on a given company’s stock, the process of catabolic collapse snowballs quickly, until support for a complex society drops so low that that society can no longer be maintained. A “freefall” of lowering complexity follows, until it reaches a level where the marginal returns for it have become favorable again, and people are willing to invest in it again.

    With complexity, we get to a more precise understanding of “civilization” than the mere “city culture” we left with before. Civilization is a culture with a unique problem-solving strategy. Its answer to every problem is to increase complexity. To invent something, or appoint someone, or establish a committee, or research something, or run some tests. We are caught in a growth cycle of ever-increasing complexity requiring ever-increasing energy, and creating an ever-larger scale society. We are already far beyond any reasonable human scale society. This is the root of that alienation that has been universally feared and hated in civilization since its very beginning. And by its very nature, civilization can only get worse.

  10. Jason Godesky Says:

    So we see why civilization is inherently unsustainable: it is, at its most basic root, a culture in growth. It is among cultures what a cancer is among cells. It grows without limit, without regard to the other systems it is enmeshed in and coexists with, largely—I understand you’re familiar with David Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous and have mentioned it here before?—because we no longer recognize ourselves as part of it. In the very same manner, cancer cells grow without limit because they have begun to unravel their telomeres—they can no longer recognize healthy cells as part of the same body. As Kenneth Boulding put it:

    Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist.

    If growth ever stops, or even slows down, our civilization—which depends on exponential growth to survive—will collapse. How could it be otherwise? The alternative would be to believe that infinite growth is possible in a finite world. “Sustainable growth” is an oxymoron, and there’s one thing all unsustainable systems have in common: they’re never sustained. I’m laying the tautologies on heavy here to make a point: the collapse of our civilization is not in question. It is tautological. Just the same as the reindeer of St. Matthew’s Island had no choice about whether their population would crash, so, too, are we well beyond the point where anything can be done to change our fate. I don’t know if people have free will or not (we’ve certainly never shown any evidence of that in our past), but I do believe in cause and effect. If we did have a chance to go a different way and avoid this, it was not in any of our lifetimes: it was 10,000 years ago, when we decided to plant some wheat rather than continue following the herds. Since then, the only choice we’ve had is how, and when, we want to face the consequences of that.

    For 10,000 years, we’ve consistently decided that “when” should be “later.” We’ve come to the brink of collapse a few times, enough to notice the pattern. Sometimes, a deus ex machina will come to save us at the last minute (though, more often, it doesn’t). All the previous collapses were staved off by technologies or possiblities that were already there, but considered too expensive or low-quality to bother with, until the crisis deepened. It’s unclear whether we have any such possibilities to save us this time—solar might, but that’s questionable. We may have finally run out of delays. But the other thing we’ve learned from these near misses is that each reprieve gives us more time to grow, and that growth puts us in an even worse position the next time collapse looms. Had we collapsed in the Bronze Age, it would have killed millions, and devastated the Mediterranean. Now there are billions of us, and we’ve devastated the whole world. What will happen if we miss this, too? Trillions, and the extinction of all life on this planet? We’re in the midst of the worst mass extinction the earth has ever seen, and it’s being driven entirely by us—or, more accurately, because such an intensely complex civilization as ours, and still growing, cannot afford to share the world with much of anything else.

    This is why I have so little optimism for plans like Quinn’s or Heinberg’s. Either they will be too little, too late, and have no effect, or they will have an effect, which will be to make a significant dent on our constant growth. After all, logically, any system is either growing or not growing—there is no third, intermediate option. Either such gradual schemes will do nothing to stop our growth and be useless, or they will be effective in slowing our growth, which will then escalate into more and more withdrawal. Such plans have a choice between being completely ineffective, or causing the collapse they seek to avoid.

    Of course, I doubt they’ll do that. Humans are good at making up stories, and we make up stories that make us feel better all the time, to justify things we know can’t be sustained. We won’t want to pass up the possibilities to have more energy and more things, so we’re more likely to run into collapse at a full tilt.

  11. Jason Godesky Says:

    So, what are the implications of all this? Is this misanthropic? I think it is not misanthropic at all. After all, to explain why humans have so many problems in civilizaton, we need to invent stories like original sin: humans are innately bad, and that’s why we always feel so ill at ease in the civilization G-d destined us to build. That’s why we chafe under our rightful leaders. That’s why we feel vaguely unfulfilled and alienated by our glorious complexity. How is this not misanthropic? Rather, primitivism says that it isn’t humans who are the problem, but civilization, and one of the worst problems with it is that it is so deeply dehumanizing. Primitivism suggests that freedom and equality are the natural human condition—human nature. It suggests that we chafe under leaders because humans don’t want or need leaders; that we feel alienated in large-scale society, because large-scale society doesn’t serve human needs. Civilization turns humans into cogs; primitivism builds communities for people.

    The violent elements of primitivism are not the ones who embrace collapse, but those who don’t, those like Zerzan or Jensen who believe that ideology exists independent of physical reality, and that civilization must be violently destroyed or it will perpetuate itself forever.

    So what do we do?

    Collapse is inevitable. It’s actually the best thing that can happen to us now (which tells us just how terrible a situation we’re really in). One way or another, voluntarily or not, with our awarness or not, this brief experiment is coming to a quick and catastrophic end. How do we deal with that?

    That’s the really big question. How do we deal with that? How do we cope with that?

    You say that understanding this provides a place for true misanthropes to air a disturbing lack of compassion, and as we’ve seen, that’s absolutely true. My question is … so what? Darwin provided the same, didn’t he? The Nazi party owed much of its foundation to certain philosophical notions of race and society derived, ultimately, from the theory of evolution. Should the possibility that some people will cope with an unpleasant truth poorly convince us not to believe what the facts so clearly indicate? Should we reject natural selection and evolution for the same reason?

    Primitivism brings with it a truth as unpleasant as evolution, but just as undeniably true. People will react poorly to it, but that says nothing as to whether or not it is true. Rather than “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” and rejecting the basic fact that civilization is unsustainable simply because some might be led to misanthropic implications, I think we should instead fight against those implications, and argue all the more forcefully for the preservation of our humanity in the last death throes of such a dehumanizing, murderous force. Civilization cannot be sustained; no system based on infinite growth ever can be. We cannot afford to allow the road beyond civilization to lay in the hands of misanthropes and terrorists. For the sake of our species, we cannot.

  12. Jason Godesky Says:

    Sorry for the flurry of comments; I figured out it would only post in sections.

  13. Rory Says:

    I have always found both sides of the “primitivists are misanthropic” to be equally hilarious.

    On one hand, you have the anti-primitivists(for lack of a better term) who ascribe all the sociopathic axe-murdering evils to the primitivists. Their arguements as to why primtivists are evil are all the same. “you don’t care about humanity, you want to see 6B humans die, you’re a cannibal” etc etc.

    On the other hand, you have the two camps of primitivists. Rooughly Jason and Anthropik represent one, and Shender and Miranda represent the other. BAsically it comes down to “see I care” and “i don’t give a crap” positions.

    What none of the three sides will admit is the basic facts of life and death. I have seen some try, but they generally get their dander up and their emotions get away from them.

    Leaving aside collapse, all humans currently alive are going to die. all humans ever born died. all humans yet to be born die. what niether side will state is that, very simply, everyone ends up dead.

    My amusement at the matter stems from the unreality that permeates both sides. Really, those 6B are going to die horrible deaths with or without collpase, from cancer, car wrecks, dysentery, aids, murder, etc etc etc. Pretty much every person who ever reads this is going to go down in a manner that is going to suck. I love cigarettes, but I am not looking forward to lung cancer.

    It would be refreshing to see both sides get off their high horses and admit that the 6B deaths are out of their control. and nothing they could do will ever change the simple facts of life and death.

    As far as the slimy underbelly is concerned, lets take a look a body counts. in the last century civlization killed an easy 300 million people, just in wars and politcal upheavals. i doubt seriously that, even if the 6b in question were all tribes, that they would have the philosophical and technological wherewithal to kill that many people.

    every philospohy has room within for psychos. Anthropik can drop, or philosophically undermine the parts of pritivism that “allow” for the slimy underbelly, but they don’t “lead the faithful”. even if they did, you would have those, like derrick jensen and his ilk, that would think they didn’t go far enough.

    this really should have gone in primitivsm flame war, but it was closed.

    That said, I like both sides, if only for their hilarity.



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